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Abstract
Blockchain technology has the potential to deploy broad
decentralized applications, greatly improving their secu-
rity and reliability. Unfortunately, despite much effort,
no existing public blockchain protocol can ensure strong
consistency with a high efficiency, while reliability of per-
missioned blockchain relies on consortium members.
We present GEEC, a inital blockchain protocol and its
runtime system by leveraging the Intel Software Guard
eXtentions (SGX) hardware. GEECachieves privacy and
security for permissioned blockchains and leveraging In-
tel SGX. GEEC can append a block with only one and
a half network round-trips and two P2P broadcasts. We
carry a proof sketch to show that GEEC is strongly consis-
tent.
1 Introduction
The emergence of blockchains makes it promising to de-
ploy diverse decentralized applications (e.g., cryptocur-
rencies and storage services), greatly improving their se-
curity and reliability. A blockchain runs as a P2P network
consisting of participating computing devices (nodes),
and its correctness requires two crucial elements. First,
it must tackle Sybil attacks, where an attacker can control
the blockchain by spawning an arbitrary number of syn-
onyms. Second, it needs a distributed consensus protocol
to let nodes confirm one totally ordered chain of blocks,
each containing a number of transactions.
To enable the deployments of general applications, an
ideal blockchain should be highly efficient: the through-
put and energy consumption of processing transactions
should be comparable to those of traditional centralized
services. Moreover, this blockchain should be strongly
consistent: appended blocks are always confirmed.
Unfortunately, despite much effort, no existing
blockchain consensus protocol can efficiently ensure
strong consistency. Existing public blockchain consensus
protocols belong to two main categories. First, Proof of
Work (PoW) protocols [17, 51, 62] let nodes concurrently
solve hash puzzles using huge computing power and com-
pete for the longest chain. In PoW, only the longest chain
is confirmed, and all the other nodes’ computation is dis-
carded. This computation eliminates Sybil attacks with
the cost of consuming excessive power but makes PoW
suffer from poor efficiency. For instance, Bitcoin [51]
consumes roughly the same electric power as Singapore
but only has an average throughput of 7 transaction/s for
worldwide users. Worse, previous work shows that PoW’s
nodes will confirm inconsistent (forked) chains when In-
ternet incurs temporary partitions.
To improve efficiency, the Proof of Stake (PoS) proto-
cols [14, 23, 29, 33, 46] give blockchain nodes that pos-
sess more coins higher probability to append blocks, then
a single node can be selected to append a block under
this probability distribution with little power consump-
tion. However, the selected node can maliciously append
two conflicting blocks, leading to double-spend attacks
and consistency violations. Algorand [29] mitigates this
problem by presenting a new Byzantine agreement proto-
col, but it assumes the nodes that possess 80% of coins are
honest (i.e., nodes follow the protocol).
These protocols need each node to prove its bets physi-
cally. Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) [31, 44]) on
commodity hardware (e.g., Intel SGX) makes it promising
to efficiently build the trust base. If some code executes
in SGX on one node, SGX can guarantee the integrity of
the code and prove the integrity of the execution to an-
other node. This can be used by a trustworthy consen-
sus protocol to efficiently select nodes to append blocks.
Recent blockchain consensus protocols use SGX in dif-
ferent aspects, including proving the identity of nodes
(Scifer [6]), replacing PoW’s useless puzzles with use-
ful computation (REM [64]), and replacing PoW’s puzzle
answers on blocks with SGX generated random numbers
(Proof-of-Luck [49]) so that the chain with the largest sum
wins.
However, even with SGX, building an efficient and
strongly consistent blockchain protocol on the asyn-
chronous Internet remains an open challenge. In a
blockchain, it is fundamentally difficult for a node to dis-
tinguish whether remote nodes go offline or they are par-
titioned. Recent work shows that attackers can perform
temporary partition attacks to make a blockchain fork.
For instance, Proof-of-Luck is prone to partition attacks
because the two partitioned group of nodes will confirm
different chains with each partition’s largest sum.
We present GEEC, an strongly consistent blockchain
consensus protocol, where an appended block is always
confirmed. We implemented GEEC on the Ethereum [17,
62] blockchain platform. We evaluated GEEC with three
blockchain systems: Ethereum [17, 62], EOS [27], and
Intel-PoET [58]. We ran GEEC on both our cluster and
the Tencent public cloud with popular blockchain work-
loads. Evaluation shows that:
• GEEC is efficient and scalable. Its throughput is
comparable to Visa’s, 1.7X∼88.5X higher than the
evaluated blockchain protocols. Its throughput is
scalable to 10K nodes on the Tencent cloud.
• GEEC is robust. It eliminates forks and maintains
reasonable throughput against node offline, packet
loss, and temporary partitions.
Our major contribution is GEEC, the first efficient and
strongly consistent consensus protocol for blockchains.
GEEC’s runtime system has the potential to deploy gen-
eral applications, greatly improving their security and re-
liability.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. §2
introduces blockchain systems and TEEs. §3 gives a brief
overview of GEEC. §4 introduces how GEEC bootstraps
and maintains the member list, §5 introduces GEEC’s
block producing protocol. §6 gives implementation de-
tails. §7 shows our evaluation, §8 introduces related work
and §9 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Blockchain and Its Consensus Protocols
Blockchain is a decentralized, highly available, and in-
destructible ledger that allows everyone to update it and
to verify its correctness. Blockchains are divided into
private and public blockchains. Private blockchains
(e.g., Hyperledger Fabric [11, 18, 60], Hyperledger Saw-
tooth [58], and RSCoin) know the identifies of all par-
ticipating nodes and runs a consensus algorithm (e.g.,
Raft [53] or BFT [19, 60]) to achieve consensus. Private
blockchains achieve efficiency but they are not designed
for nodes running in the Internet scale. This paper targets
at public blockchains, which admit anyone to join the net-
work and run a node.
Public blockchain are being developed to support more
applications than just cryptocurrencies. For instance,
Ethereum [17, 62] provides a smart contract mechanism
where users can run Turing-complete deterministic appli-
cations (e.g., lottery systnems). Moreover, digital vot-
ing, digital identity verification, and decentralized storage
trading are being developed on public blockchains [15].
These promising applications often desire efficiency and
strong consistency.
2.2 Intel SGX
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is used to build se-
cure systems to defend privileged attacks (e.g., OS root
users). Intel Software Guard eXtension (SGX) [31,44,45]
is the most popular TEE product in commodity CPUs.
SGX provides a secure execution environment called
hardware enclaves, and the code can enter an enclave us-
ing ECalls. Memory (data and code) and cpu states in
enclaves can not be tampered with or read by any code
outside enclaves.
SGX provides two kinds of attestations [10,22,32] (lo-
cal and remote) to prove that the particular piece of code
is running in a genuine SGX-enabled CPU. In a local at-
testation, an enclave directly attests another enclave on
the same machine using CPU instructions. In a remote at-
testation, SGX produces a report of measurements of the
enclave (e.g., code, cpu generations) and signs it before
returning it to a challenger. The challenger then connects
to a Intel’s Attestation Service (IAS) and get a QUOTE
to confirm that the code is running in a genuine Intel
CPU. SGX also provides a linkable attestation mode for
challengers to identify enclaves from the same machines.
During attestations, the challengers can establish a secure
communication channel with the help of key-exchange
protocols (e.g., Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange [16]). All
SGX-based blockchain systems [1,6,49,58,64] and GEEC
uses attestations to build trust base among blockchain
nodes.
SGX provides a trustworthy source of random num-
ber via its sgx read rand API [31] which calls the
hardware based pseudorandom generator(PRNG) through
RDRAND on Intel CPUs [22]. Previous studies show that
this random number generator is safe and cannot be al-
tered from outside the enclave [12, 30, 50].
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3 Overview
3.1 GEEC’s Threat Model
GEEC allows any node with SGX to join its P2P network
via its registration protocol ( §4.2). GEEC has two de-
sign goals. First, strong consistency. With overwhelm-
ing probability, GEEC guarantees that no two nodes will
see different sequences of blocks (i.e., no forks). Second,
egalitarian. On expectation, each registered node should
append the same number of blocks to the blockchain.
For SGX, GEEC has the same threat model as typical
SGX-based systems [6, 49, 58, 64]. We trust the hardware
and software of the SGX and its remote attestation ser-
vices. The code and data inside SGX are trusted. Besides,
the random numbers generator in SGX is trusted (§2.2).
Side-channel and access pattern attacks on SGX are out of
the scope of this paper, but GEEC can handle DoS attacks.
GEEC also makes standard assumptions on cryptographic
primitives.
Unlike existing committee-based blockchain systems
(e.g., Algorand [29] and Scifer [6]) which assume the hon-
esty of most nodes, GEEC preserves strong consistency
without this assumption. In GEEC, a node’s code run-
ning outside SGX is not trusted and can behave arbitrarily.
To ensure reasonable liveness, same as Algorand, GEEC
needs a vast majority (e.g., 70%) of its nodes to be online.
To achieve this, GEEC provides an incentive mechanism
(§4.2).
3.2 Architecture
GEEC’s block is committed by committees and each com-
mittee confirms one block. For each committee, C nodes
are randomly selected as the committee members, and one
committee node is elected as a proposer to append each
block. GEEC has three modules running in the SGX on
each node:
Registrationmodule (§4.2) handles the joining request
of new nodes. When a remote node want to join, the
module first attests genuineness of the remote node, it
then generates a signed registration transaction and broad-
casts the transaction. Once the transaction is included in
GEEC’s blockchain, the node joins successfully.
Consensus module (§5) runs GEEC’s consensus pro-
tocol on all registered nodes. This protocol ensures at
most one node is selected as the proposer to append each
block. The consensus module of the proposer generates
a signed proof to be included in the block by the pro-
poser’s blockchain core, so that other nodes can validate
the block.
4 Bootstrapping GEEC
4.1 Initialization of the Blockchain
To achieve decentralization, all configurations and setup
of blockchain should be determined and deliveredwith the
genesis (0th) block. In GEEC, the genesis block contains
two key components, the first is normal blockchain con-
figuration (GEEC parameters) and the second is the mea-
surement of GEEC’s enclave (hash of enclave codeHc).
The creator (GEEC’s publisher) of the genesis block
first registers the Intel IAS service and gets a creden-
tial cre, and then chooses one genesis consensus node
which supports Intel SGX and installs GEEC’s enclave
code. The creator does a remote attestation to the enclave
and receives a QUOTE Qn (§2.2), which confirms the
success of the attestation. After the attestation, GEEC’s
registration module generates two asymmetric key pairs
- the enclave account key pair (pK0, sK0) as a per-node
identity (account) and a key pair (pKshared, sKshared)
shared among GEEC’s referee module for secret transac-
tions. Then the creator generates the genesis block with
Block0 = (pKshared,member(pK0, Q0), Hc).
4.2 On-chain Node Join
In GEEC, the registration module on each registered node
serves as a challenger for attesting a newly joining node
i with three steps. First, the new node sets up the en-
clave code (with hash Hc). The new node generates its
account (pKi, sKi) in local enclave. Then the new node
broadcasts a join request to GEEC members. Second, a
challenger j who receives the join request starts a remote
attestation. After the attestation succeeds with a returned
QUOTE Qi from IAS, the challenger’s registration mod-
ule transfers the shared key (pKshared, sKshared) and the
credential cre through the DHKE secure channel to node
i. Third, the challenger broadcasts a registration trans-
action (§3.2) 〈Signsk(member(pKi, Qi)), pk〉. Node i
joins the GEEC member list when the transaction is con-
firmed. GEEC only allows each CPU with SGX to join
as one node by using linkable attestation mode (§2.2). To
remove zombie nodes, this membership only persists for
1K blocks, which maintains reasonable online ratio and
liveness for GEEC.
5 Block Appending Protocol
In a high level, GEEC’s protocol works in three steps. First
(§5.1), from the last confirmed block, a committee and a
group of acceptors are derived. The committee is explicit
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to all nodes, and it will be reformed if a block cannot be
appended with a timeout. Second (§5.2), the committee
selects a unique proposer. Third (§5.3), to append next
block, a proposer first learns whether there is a potentially
confirmed block. If so, the proposer proposes the same
block; otherwise, it can propose any block. When propos-
ing a block, it needs to seekmajority votes from the accep-
tors. To encourage nodes to join GEEC and to often stay
online, GEEC gives block-appending rewards (transaction
fees) to the nodes that participate in the protocol.
In GEEC, SGX guarantees that all nodes follow the pro-
tocol logic. Moreover, an attacker cannot generate a ma-
licious protocol message presenting itself as a consensus
participant to affect the protocol logic. This is because ev-
ery GEEC node’s account (pk) has been publicly stored on
the blockchain, and only code running in the node’s SGX
knows the corresponding sk. Each GEEC protocol mes-
sage is signed by sk and carries pk, such that any GEEC
node detect a malicious message.
5.1 Selecting Committee and Acceptors
With the joined node list stored on the blockchain, a
strawman approach is to randomly select only one pro-
poser each time (i.e., committee size is one). However,
this approach has bad liveness because if the selected pro-
poser is offline, many timeouts may happen until finding
an online proposer. Therefore, GEEC takes a committee
based approach because GEEC can efficiently find a pro-
poser if a majority of the committee is online.
For each block, GEEC selects C committee members
from the registered member list stored on the confirmed
blocks. The committee formation protocol has two basic
requirements. First, it needs to be verifiable so that any
node can verify the members of the committee. Second,
the selection needs to be unpredictable: a previous com-
mittee member cannot control the identities of next com-
mittee members, which prevents the system from being
controlled by a small group of people.
GEEC’s committee selection protocol meets these two
requirements. GEEC uses a random number r (§5.2) on
the last confirmed block as a seed to a uniform sampling
function to select committee members, with a commit-
tee version number Cv = 0. Therefore, this commit-
tee is known to all nodes. If the committee cannot make
progress, a new committee is formed after a timeout (15s
in GEEC) on each node, and the Cv for the new commit-
tee is incremented by one. However, using the same seed
and same member list will select the same group of com-
mittee and GEEC’s committee selection protocol will get
stuck. Therefore, GEEC uses the hash of previous seed
as the new seed to select a new committee. There may
be different committees with differentCv among nodes at
the same moment, which GEEC readily considers (§5.3).
Acceptors are selected by the proposer of last con-
firmed block in SGX. When it generates the block, it ran-
domly selects N acceptors from the member list, gener-
atesN certificates using each selected acceptor’s pK , and
includes the N resultant certificates in the block. There-
fore, a true acceptor can decrypt one certificate using its
sK and confirms its identity.
5.2 Proposer Election
GEEC’s proposer election protocol elects one proposer for
each block from a committee. A naive approach is to
implement an existing election protocol (e.g., Raft [53])
running in SGX. However, there are two problems. First,
Raft’s election protocol can have split-vote (no node gets
majority votes) and need to retry. When runs on the In-
ternet with 100 nodes, the problem becomes more severe
and greatly degrades the performance. Second, this ap-
proach is not egalitarian among committee members. The
reason is that Raft focuses on achieving fast consensus in
a collaboration but not competing environment, where the
node that starts the election first will likely become the
leader.
To solve these problems, GEEC introduces a new, ran-
dom number based proposer election protocol. GEEC
lets each committee member to generate a trusted random
number r inside SGX. During the election, a node will
only vote for another node with a larger r, and a node that
receives votes from a majority of the committee members
will win the election. We do not select the global largest
number because this will require all nodes to be online.
To mitigate split-vote, GEEC’s election protocol intro-
duces a representative mechanism. If a committee mem-
ber A votes for B, then A makes B be its representative.
If B is able to get a majority of votes, then B will be
elected, otherwise B can vote for other committee mem-
bers representing both itself and A. The detailed protocol
works as follows with one network round-trip:
When a node receives the (n− 1)th block and finds it-
self in the committee with version Cv for the nth block,
the node tries to elect itself as the proposer. It first sends
a 〈Signsk(elect, r, n, Cv), pk〉 message to all other com-
mittee members using UDP, where r is the trusted random
number generated in TEE and pk is the node’s account
(§4.2). It then waits for votes from all other members. If
it receives a vote from a remote node, it becomes the rep-
resentative of the remote node; if it receives a majority of
votes, it wins the election.
4
Algorithm 1 Proposer’s algorithm
1: function LEARN(Cv, Nacceptor):
2: if Cv == 0 then
3: blk ← GenerateBlock()
4: else
5: count← 0
6: BlkList← [ ]
7: Broadcast(Signsk(learn,Cv), pk)
8: while count <= Nacceptor/2 do
9: msg← recv().verify()
10: switch msg.type do:
11: case EMPTY :
12: count++
13: case NOTIFY :
14: count++
15: Append(BlkList,msg.Blk)
16: if BlkList == [ ] then:
17: blk ← GenerateBlock()
18: else
19: blk ← MaxVerBlock(BlkList)
20: return blk
21:
22: function PROPOSE(blk,Cv, Nacceptor):
23: count← 0
24: Broadcast(Signsk(propose, blk, Cv), pk)
25: while msg← recv().verify() do
26: if V erifyV ote(msg) then
27: count ++
28: if count > Nacceptor/2 then
29: break;
30: Broadcast(Signsk(confirm, blk.header), pk)
When a node receives a elect message, it first checks
the signature and whether they have the same Cv . If the
node has not generated the random number for block n,
it generates it first. If the elect message’s r is larger than
the node’s own r, the node votes for who sends the mes-
sage using UDP with 〈Signsk(vote, n, Cv), pk〉. If it is
the representative of other nodes, it also transfer the votes
to who sends the message.
5.3 Confirming a Block
We derive GEEC’s proposer and acceptor algorithms from
“Paxos Made Simple” due to its proven safety and sim-
plicity. We elect a single proposer from each committee
because allowing multiple proposers will make the con-
sensus harder to converge.
Algorithm 1 shows the proposer’s algorithm for con-
firming a block. It first invokes Learn function whether
there is a potentially confirmed block. If not (normal
case), it can propose any block it wants; if yes, it just pro-
Algorithm 2 An acceptor’s algorithm
1: function ACCEPTORVOTE:
2: Cvmax ← 0
3: Blkpending ← null
4: while msg← recv().verify() do
5: switch msg.type do:
6: case PROPOSE:
7: ifmsg.Cv > Cvmax then
8: msg.Cv > Cvmax
9: hash← msg.blk.header
10: ci← Encmsg.pk(vote, hash, pk)
11: Reply(Signsk(ci), pk)
12: Blkpending ← msg.blk
13: case LEARN:
14: if Blkpending == null then
15: ci← Encmsg.pk(empty, pk)
16: Reply(Signsk(ci), pk)
17: else
18: B ← (Blkpending , Cvmax)
19: ci← Encmsg.pk(notify,B, pk)
20: Reply(Signsk(ci), pk)
poses potentially confirmed block returned by Learn. The
function must wait for a majority of acceptors’ responses.
If Learn successfully returns a block, the proposer calls a
Propose function, proposes this block, and waits a major-
ity of votes from the acceptors, and then broadcasts a con-
firmmessage. The proposer keeps retrying these functions
until it receives a confirm message and knows it failed.
Algorithm 2 shows the acceptor’s algorithm. An accep-
tor maintains the highest committee version is has voted
for. On receiving a request for votes, if it has not voted
for any block with a higher committee version, it sends its
vote. On receiving learn message with version Cv, if it
already has sent a vote for a (pending) block, it replies the
block to the proposer using UDP; otherwise, it replies an
empty message.
5.4 Proof Sketch of Correctness
In this subsection, we provide a sketch of proof on the
strong consistency (safety) guarantees of GEEC. We prove
GEEC’s safety by induction. Suppose GEEC guarantees
safety from the 0th (i.e., genesis) block to the (n − 1)th
block, and we prove that there is only one unique blockB
can be confirmed as the nth block in the blockchain. The
based case is trivial because all nodes start from the same
genesis block.
From the induction hypothesis, since block (n − 1) is
unique, the N acceptors list included in block (n − 1) is
unique and unchanged. If there are two different blocks
B1 and B2 confirmed as the nth block, we try to prove
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contradiction. Since each version of committee only has
one proposer, the two blocks must have different ver-
sion Cv1 and Cv2. Without losing generality, we assume
Cv1 < Cv2. Since Cv1 is confirmed, there must be a ma-
jority of acceptors voted for it. Then, if the proposer for
Cv1 + 1 proposed a block, it must learnt B1 when calling
the Learn function in Algorithm 1. This is because this
function only returns after it hears from a majority of ac-
ceptors and two majorities must overlap, it must hear B1
with the max version Cv1 from an acceptor (according to
Algorithm 2). By recursion, we can find that for any ver-
sion Cv > Cv1, the proposed block can only be B1 and
thus B2 = B1 and the strong consistency holds.
6 Implementation Details
We implemented GEEC in the Golang implementation of
Ethereum [28] (i.e., Geth), which is the official and most
stable implementation version of Ethereum. Since Intel
only provides SGX SDKs in C/C++ language, so we adopt
cgo in Golang to invoke the SGX ECalls in GEEC.
Geth has an interface for implementing new consensus
engines, which needs to implement mainly the functions
for sealing blocks. GEEC checks whether it is a commit-
tee member according to the committee formation proto-
col (§5.1) on receiving new blocks. When a node tries
to seal a block, it first invoke a ECall to do the proposer
election (§5.2). The proposer invokes the two algorithms
(§5.3) implemented in enclaves via as an SGX ECall. If
the election succeeds, the ECall returns a signed proof for
the proposer to seal in the block.
We modified 2073 lines of Golang code for Geth, and
implemented the election protocol (§5.2 and the accep-
tor mechanism (§5.3) for 1043 lines of C code to run in
Intel SGX. GEEC’s consensus protocol is general for all
blockchain platforms and the two enclaves for election
protocol and partition detection protocol work as stand-
alone libraries and can be directly ported.
Config Cluster Cloud
# Nodes 300 up to 10K
Committee Size 30 30
Acceptor Size 100 300
Table 1: GEEC’s evaluation parameters.
7 Evaluation
Our evaluation was done on both the Tencent public cloud
and our own cluster consisting of 32 machines. In our
cluster, each machine has Linux 3.13.0, 40Gbps NIC,
2.60GHz Intel E3-1280 V6 CPU with SGX, 64GB mem-
ory, and 1TB SSD. On the public cloud, we started 100
instances (VMs) running in the same city, each of which
has 32 cores, 128GB memory, and up to 100 Mbps NIC.
We did not choose the EC2 cloud because she was only
able to rent each user 3 instances. While running GEEC
on both our cluster and public cloud, we used the Linux
TC command to limit the network latency between each
two GEEC nodes to 200ms (same as Algorand’s evalua-
tion setting). Because this cloud does not provide SGX
hardware, we ran GEEC in the SGX simulation mode.
We compared GEEC’s performance with four
blockchain systems, including three public blockchains
(Ethereum [28], EOS [27], and Snow-white [14]) and
one SGX-based private blockchain system, Hyperledger-
Sawtooth (Intel-PoET) [57]. These systems cover two
PoW systems (Ethereum and Sawtooh) and two PoS
systems (EOS, and Snow-white). We ran three of the
systems (Ethereum, EOS, and Sawtooh) in our cluster
because they were open-source, while Snow-White’s
results were from their papers. For Intel PoET, we
used its own benchmark tools; for other three systems,
we let each node to generate cryptocurrency transfer
transactions. Table 1 shows the parameters we used in
evaluation.
7.1 Efficiency
Our evaluation shows that GEEC’s throughput is at least
1.7X higher than the evaluated public blockchains be-
cause GEEC’s consensus protocol (§5) only needs 1.5
network round-trip and two P2P broadcasts to elect a
unique proposer. Ethereum is a fast PoW protocol which
has a low block mining time compared to other PoW
blockchains. However, its throughput is still much lower
than GEEC’s. Although EOS whitepaper [27] estimates a
throughput of 100K transaction/s, we found its through-
put 420 transaction/s in our cluster. The reason is that
EOS’s latest open-source implementation was under de-
velopment and it lacked several crucial features (e.g., par-
allel chains and parallel signature verification) reported in
their whitepaper. After all, EOS relies on pre-determined
super nodes [27]. PoET achieved a low throughput be-
cause it uses PoW. Snow-White [14] presents in their pa-
per that it can achieve up to 150 transaction/s with 40
nodes on Amazon EC2. Overall, we found GEEC the
fastest in evaluation.
Recently, Hyperledger-Fabric [11, 18] reported a no-
table throughput of about 10K transaction/s using a
byzantine ordering service. Hyperledger-Fabric is a pri-
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vate blockchain which is not designed to scale to nodes
from the Internet, while GEEC is for public blockchains.
8 Related Work
Public Blockchain System Proof of Work. BitCoin [51]
is the first PoW based blockchain system that works as
a fully functional cryptocurrency system, but it suffers
from hugpropose toe energy consumption and bad per-
formance. Bitcoin-NG and Fruitchain [55] use multi-
ple types of blocks to improve the throughput of Bit-
coin. GHOST [59] proposes to select a subtree rather than
the longest chain when the blockchain forks to reduce
wasted blocks. Ethereum [17, 62] reduces the difficulty
of hash computations in PoW and introduces the uncle
block mechanism to reduce potential forks. Solidus, Byz-
Coin [36], PeerCensus [25], and Hybrid Consensus [56]
use PoW to select a group of committee and runs a
byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) protocols [19] to achieve
consensus on a single block. Elastico [41] and Om-
niLedger [37] propose a sharding approach inspired by
traditional database to linearly scale existing blockchains’
throughput. These works improves the throughput and la-
tency of PoW based blockchain but still consume large
amount of energy. Moreover, the BFT protocols assume
more than two thirds of the selected committee members
are honest. GEEC has good performance and does not as-
sume the honesty of the nodes.
Proof of Stake. Algorand [29, 46] selects nodes to
form a committee with the probability proportional to
each nodes’ number of coins (i.e., stake). It assumes an
extremely powerful adversary that can compromise the
committee members once they send out packets, so it lets
each committee member to determine whether it is a com-
mittee member independently, and proposes a customized
byzantine agreement protocol to let each committee only
sends one messages in each round. GEEC differs from
Algorand. To preserve strong consistency, Algorand as-
sumes a vast majority (e.g., 80%) of the users to be honest
because it works on arbitrarily devices, while GEEC does
not need this assumption by leveraging SGX.
Praos [23, 33] and Snow-White [14] are two PoS sys-
tems similar to Algorand that each node independently de-
termines whether it is the proposer of next block. Praos
uses a secure multi-party computation algorithm; Snow-
white uses a PoW similar hash computation mechanism
and set each node’s hash target according to their stakes.
EOS [27] is a PoS system that uses off-bandmethods (i.e.,
selling tokens) to elect 49 super nodes and runs a BFT
protocol in a 21 node committee with this 49 super nodes
to append new blocks. Unlike GEEC, PoS systems often
require a vast majority of nodes to be honest.
Private Blockchain. Private blockchain systems re-
quire a centralized company (or a consortium of them)
to control the joining and consensus of nodes. Hyper-
ledger [11, 18] trusts its committee nodes which are stat-
ically configured by consortium policy. These nodes
achieve consensus by contacting a byzantine tolerant or-
dering service runs on another sets of partially trusted
nodes. RSCoin lets a set of trusted authorities to run a
cryptocurrency and divides them into different levels to
improve performance. BlockBench [26] is an evaluation
framework for comparing different private blockchain
systems. In general, private blockchains are efficient but
are not designed to work in the Internet scale.
Blockchain Applications. Diverse applications have
been developed on blockchains. Ethereum [17] intro-
duces EVM, a deterministic runtime, to run smart con-
tract applications on all consensus nodes of a blockchain.
Hawk [38] and zkLedger [52] focus on enhancing confi-
dentiality of smart contracts. Ekiden [20] offloads the ex-
ecution of smart contracts to a small group of SGX pow-
ered computing nodes, so that Ekiden can avoid the repet-
itive, redundant smart contract executions on all consen-
sus nodes. ShadowEth [63] works similar as Ekiden. To
deploy an application in Ekiden or ShadowEth, these ap-
plication has to be mostly re-written using the smart con-
tract language [17]. Overall, GEEC’s consensus protocol
is complementary to these application systems and can be
integrated in their underlying consensus layer.
TEE-powered Blockchain Consensus. Recently,
TEE has been leveraged to improve diverse aspects of
blockchain systems. Intel’s Proof of Elapsed Time [58]
efficiently replaces the PoW puzzles with a trusted timer
in SGX. GEEC is for public blockchains that any node can
join, while PoET is a private blockchain with a known
member list. Moreover, our evaluation (§7.1) shows that
GEEC achieves better performance than PoET. Resource
efficient mining [64] uses “useful” computation (e.g., big
data computation) to replace the “useless” PoW puzzles
and uses SGX to count the amount of the useful computa-
tion. Proof of Luck [49] presents a protocol that lets each
miner seal a random number generated from SGX into
the block as the “luck” of the block. The protocol selects
the chain with the largest accumulative luck as the win-
ner. This protocol will have inconsistency (forks) when
the network is temporarily partitioned because the par-
titions will confirm different largest accumulative luck.
CoCo [1] is an ongoing private blockchain project that
can support diverse consensus protocol (e.g., Raft [53])
in SGX-powered nodes. Currently, CoCo has not de-
scribed a detailed consensus protocol or evaluation re-
7
sults. SCIFER [6] uses SGX’s remote attestation feature to
establish a reliable identity for each user, records the iden-
tities on the blockchain and select the oldest active user
as the proposer of the each block. SCIFER uses nodes’
“ages” on the blockchain to run a voting algorithm to se-
lect a block proposer, so the safety of this protocol has
to assume a vast majority of nodes to be honest; GEEC’s
safety does not rely on any node’s honesty.
9 Conclusion
We have presented GEEC, the first efficient, strongly con-
sistent and general consensus protocol and its runtime sys-
tem for public blockchains. The stealth acceptor abstrac-
tion takes the first step to enable the strong safety of Paxos
to be integrated in GEEC’s consensus protocol. Exten-
sive evaluation shows that GEEC is efficient, scalable, ro-
bust and has the potential to support general applications,
greatly improving their security and reliability on Internet.
GEEC’s source code and evaluation results are released on
github.com/ndsi19-p25/geec.
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